The saving rate in China is high by historical and international norms. The high saving rate has funded capital accumulation which in turn has been the primary driver of China's economic growth. We review the evidence on Chinese household saving and conduct a small study to assess the importance of the precautionary motive for saving.
Introduction
In this paper, we report the results of a small study that compares precautionary saving in China to that in the U.S. This is but one of many aspects of household saving in China which has recently received attention in the research community, and household saving itself is only dimension of the country's gross national saving. We are taking a look at a small piece of a very big topic.
The big picture issue is this. Despite the recent media and political attention given to Chinese external surpluses, the primary driver of decades of double-digit Chinese aggregate GDP growth which has lifted millions out of subsistence-level poverty, has not been exports but investment spending. Because the capital account is essentially closed, especially in terms of financial capital, most of China's investment has been financed by domestic sources of saving.
That is the sum of government, corporate, and household saving. Of these three components, household saving has been and continues to be the largest piece of gross national saving. Today, household saving is high both by historical and by international standards. Hence, it has been the component that has received the most research. The precautionary motive for saving is, to date, perhaps the least researched aspect of household saving in China.
Developing a thorough and nuanced understanding of Chinese saving is becoming an important topic, however, precisely because of the ongoing and increasing external imbalances between surplus countries such as China and deficit countries such as the U.S. The trajectories of imbalances cannot be sustained and increasingly, calls are being made for China to re-balance its growth away from investment towards consumption. (Less vociferous calls are being made for the U.S. to control its fiscal position and to increase household saving.) This would require less saving by the Chinese and more saving by Americans. Hence, it would appear that a necessary precondition to have a productive conversation about growth re-balancing would be to a good understanding of why the Chinese save so much.
A review of the data, which we do in the next section, will show that China's economic rise since the free market reforms were implemented in 1978 that the Chinese growth model has primarily been investment driven. GDP growth has remained steady and high even during recessionary times of the rest of the world. The investment to GDP ratio has also been high by international standards. The current account surplus to GDP ratio, which has historically been moderate, began to surge only in 2005, hence garnering substantial attention in the policy arena, but what is perhaps less widely discussed is that the investment to GDP ratio has also been rising since 2005. Since the capital account, especially with respect to financial capital, is (nearly) closed, real investment has been financed entirely by domestic sources of saving. A review of the patterns of saving by household, corporate or enterprise and government sectors shows that the surge in saving that has accompanied (or caused) the surge in the current account has come from the government sector.
A review of recent literature on household saving in China finds that the empirical research has mainly focused on testing aspects of the life-cycle/permanent income theory of saving. In turn, we focus our attention on the effects of the income growth rate, demographic variations, and income uncertainty on the household saving rate. Interestingly, previous research that has looked at these determinants have reported mixed results. We focus on these factors because their behavior has been on the extreme, and hence, their explanatory power should be high. Income growth, we know has been exceedingly high, there have been immense changes in the Chinese demographic structure and these changes should have widespread implications for the saving rate and economic life in China is substantially more risky than it is in the developed/industrialized world. That demographic changes, largely brought on by population control measures (the one-child policy) since the late 1970s should matter stems from reductions in average family size, thereby loosening household budget constraints, and a rise in the oldage dependency ratio which affects the solvency of formal and informal sources of retirement support. The narrative often given for why there should be a strong precautionary element to Chinese household saving is convincing. In a nutshell, the story is that the cradle-to-grave social welfare safety net provided by the government under central planning has been all but dismantled. Housing, education, and old-age income support that once was provided by the enterprises are now the responsibility of individuals. Reform and downsizing of the state sector (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) resulted in massive movements of labor from State Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOEs) to private and foreign-owned firms and associated increases in income uncertainty. The narrative suggests that economic life is sizably and significantly more risky in China than it is in the United States. This narrative is also backed up by what we find in the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section undertakes a review of recent trends in GDP growth, investment, and saving in China. Section 3 presents a selected review of the literature on Chinese household saving studies. Section 4 reviews some recent work by the authors on the role of demographic variations on Chinese saving. Section 5 discusses a small scale study on the precautionary motive for saving in China, and Section 6 concludes.
Saving and Growth: Some International Comparisons
The story of China's phenomenal economic growth since the implementation of free market reforms in 1978 and it's attendant rise in the world economy has been told often and is by now well known. Table 1 shows annual real GDP growth rates in selected years for the G-3 plus China, where we see three mature economies that have more or less have attained the steady state and one country that is in transition. China experiences high growth rates around 10 percent per year. It experiences only moderate slowdowns to breakneck growth in 1990 and in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (1998-99). Certainly Japan did much worse during the Asian crisis. In the recent mortgage-backed securities crisis, the U.S. suffered somewhat, Germany and Japan got clobbered but China seems to have emerged for the most part unscathed. A resumption of pre-crisis growth patterns across all four countries appears to be securely underway. The source of this growth, it would seem, is the same as predicted from textbook models of growth, namely capital accumulation and improvements in total factor productivity. In
China's case, the contribution from capital accumulation may be dominant, as Table 3 shows.
The table reports the ratio of investment to GDP (5 year averages) for the G-3 and China. As can be seen, China's investment, which had been on a torrid pace for the last 30 years seems to have accelerated in the 5 years since 2005 which is all the more noteworthy since this interval includes the recent financial crisis. China's experience contrasts sharply with the G-3. Over the years, the investment share of GDP has remained fairly stable in the U.S. while Germany and Japan have experienced fairly large declines (of about 7 percentage points over the sample).
1 CIA World Factbook, 2011. patterns of current accounts that were interrupted by the crisis appears also to have resumed.
The point isn't that China's current account imbalance is not large (it is), or that exports aren't important (they are). The point is that large current account surpluses in China is a relatively recent phenomenon while high growth has been going on for 30 years. Hence, China's growth appears not to be explicitly to have been led by exports but by investment and this investment has primarily been funded by internally generated saving. Why?
First, the capital account, especially the financial account, is closed in order for the authorities to maintain a fixed exchange rate with some semblance of monetary control. Second, the current account surpluses tell us that the country has been generating net capital outflows. To see the behavior of the various components of China's internal savings, Table 5 shows a breakdown of Chinese saving by sector. Here, it can be seen that the post 2005 surge in current account coincides with a surge in government saving. Government saving rose due to increasing revenues but government expenditures have stayed flat. While a jump in household saving is not the cause of the surging external imbalance, China wouldn't have the current account surplus without the support of high household saving rates. As seen from the table, the household sector accounts for the largest share of national saving.
To summarize, we have seen that China's post 1978 reform economic growth is very fast and it has been driven in large part by high investment rates funded by domestic saving of which household saving is the most important component.
Who cares?
The persistent external deficits in the U. The WEO then goes on in chapter 4 to emphasize exchange rate (i.e., RMB) appreciation as the re-balancing mechanism for surplus countries (i.e., China). There are several reason, however, that the exchange rate mechanism is not likely to be as effective as the IMF staff suggest. First, re-balancing requires not only a reduction from surplus countries but also a reduction from deficit countries. It is difficult to see how an RMB appreciation can have any meaningful effect on U.S. fiscal balances or on U.S. household saving. Second, the argument for using the exchange rate to adjust the current account rests on the supposition that there will be an effective an expenditure switching effect. Dong (2007) , however, finds that the importance of the expenditure-switching effect has declined over time and concludes that the scope for current account adjustment from changes in the nominal exchange rate are quite What are the possible channels of an RMB appreciation on saving? An appreciation has a deflationary impact, and to the extent that the private sector holds foreign currency denominated assets, an appreciation might work through a wealth effect to depress consumption. Also, a contraction in exports would reduce output and hence income. Thus, the uncertain effect that an appreciation would have on income and consumption leaves an uncertain impact on saving. Investment, on the other hand is likely to decline as the costs climb for foreign firms engaging in FDI into China and as Chinese exporting firms cut back national investment after finding themselves in a more challenging environment.
Hence, to find new channels of consumption in the surplus countries, it is necessary to understand why that consumption has been blocked off. The flip side of this topic is to understand why China saves so much.
Recent Literature on the Chinese Household Saving Rate
In advanced economies with well developed and functioning capital markets and established rules of corporate governance, we can assume that firms are owned by the households and that households exercise decision making over issues such as dividend policy (i.e., corporate saving).
This framework is not applicable for China because a significant share of the business sector is Researchers have also looked for evidence for habit persistence as evidence for a cultural influence on saving. The idea here is that a fundamental part of Chinese culture is thrift.
Modigliani and Cao (2004) reject this idea on prima facie grounds from the observation that the household saving rate in the pre-reform era was very low, averaging 3.9 percent from 1959 to 1977. This was, however, during the central planning era when people participated in an extensive social safety net provided by the state so there may have been few reasons to save. As to the evidence on habit persistence, Horioka and Wan (2006) find that an increase in today's saving rate leads to a higher saving rate tomorrow which they interpret as evidence for habit persistence, whereas Chamon and Prasad fail to find current saving growth to be related to lagged saving growth.
Chamon and Prasad (2010) discovered that the traditional hump-shaped age-saving profile had in recent years become U-shaped in China, with young and older (still working) households saving a higher fraction of income than middle-aged households. They investigate and find evidence that the shifting burden from the state to individuals for health and education has resulted in the U-shape. Young households save more in anticipation of future high education expense for their young children while older households save more in anticipation of high future medical care costs. Song and Yang (2010) explain the emergence of the U-shaped profile as resulting from the age-earnings profile. They document that the earnings of young workers grow faster than those of older workers while at the same time, cohort-specific age-earnings profile is flatter than what is normal for a transition economy. Hence, the flattened age-earnings profile combined with high entry wages give young workers an incentive to increase saving because their income won't grow very fast over time. For older households, they argue that the saving rate has increased in recent years due to the reforms in the Chinese pension system which has reduced coverage and left the system unfunded.
Demographic factors, as a determinant of saving, is widely discussed but usually not found to be quantitatively or empirically important. In theory, we expect an increase in the youth dependency (e.g., the ratio of youths to working aged people) ratio to lower saving since holding income constant, a higher level of household expenditures should be devoted to children's consumption. We would also expect an increase in the old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of retirees to working aged) to lower saving since the elderly will be financing their consumption from dissaving, whereas an increase in future old-age dependency ratio should increase saving on the grounds that there will be fewer workers to provide support in retirement.
Here, the econometric evidence here is mixed. Kraay (2000) did not find the dependency ratio (he used population divided by employment) to be significant, Modigliani and Cao (2004) found that an increase in the young dependency ratio was associated with a decline in the saving rate, while the evidence in Horioka and Wan (2006) was mixed (sometimes significant, other times not. Also, sometimes the slope coefficients were positive, other times negative).
Chamon and Prasad (2010) find only a very small effect of demographics on the saving rate.
The evidence on the precautionary motive for saving is similarly mixed. 
Demographics and Saving in a Parameterized Overlapping Generations model
China's demographic landscape has undergone such significant change in the last 30 years, that it is surprising that the empirical literature has not found more systematic evidence of the effect of demographic variation on the saving rate. The most dramatic change is what we think can be defended as an exogenous decline in fertility resulting from enforcement of the one-child policy. As Table 6 , Chinese women had a fertility rate of over 6 between 1950 to 1954, but now this figure is even lower than for the U.S. 
Precautionary Saving
Many authors have commented that public policy changes in China have resulted in increased income risk for Chinese workers. One significant reform involves the pension system (Sin, 2005) .
During the central planning period, citizens were guaranteed employment in SOEs or other state institutions and as such, were provided with basic pensions, health care, and education. These benefits were provided by and paid for by the SOEs. There were no employee contributions.
Then in the late 1980s, the country embarked on a series of SOE reforms. The privatization of small and medium sized SOEs and the hardening of the budget constraints on surviving SOEs meant significant curtailing of promised benefits. In 1991, a two-pillar pension system was implemented which consisted of a social PAYGO pension from which SOEs were supposed to contribute 17 percent of wages, and an individual accounts system from which employees would contribute 8 percent of wages and SOEs to contribute 3 percent. A major reform to the pension system was put in place in 1997 which was aimed at covering the entire urban workforce and would provide health, unemployment, disability, and maternity benefits. This was the plan, de jure. The de facto experience has been much different. Sin (2005) and Dunaway and Arora Why the low coverage? The reforms have been bogged down by "legacy costs." That is the difference betwene the benefits of those covered in the old system and the new system.
Since the old system was unfunded and the new system set contribution rates to fund a lower replacement rate, the transition to the new system has turned out to be an unfunded liability.
Since the system is unfunded, the incentive is not to participate.
Another reform involved the privatization and/or closing of loss-making small to medium sized SOEs, and the hardening of surviving SOE budget constraints (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . having generated a world-wide saving glut, resulting in low interest rates and (financial) capital flows to the U.S.
Estimates of Income Uncertainty
Instead of looking at the change in income uncertainty over time, as in Chamon, Liu and Prasad, we are interested in a comparison of the precautionary motive between the U.S. and China.
In 
Modeling the income process
"Labor income" Y t is assumed to evolve according to
where e ut is a multiplicative transitory shock in year t and P t is permanent labor income in year t (i.e. the value of income when e ut = 1). The log of P is assumed to follow a random walk with drift, ln P t+1 = ln G + ln P t + n t+1 or in levels,
where G is the gross growth rate for permanent income, and e nt is the multiplicative shock to permanent income in year t. The income data appears to be distributed lognormally, except at the lower tail of the income distribution. Hence, as in CHZ, we model transitory income as a mixture of a lognormal distribution and a (near) zero event which is defined as an observation of non capital income that fall below 10 percent of trend income.
In the CHNS urban sample, 69 near-zero income events occur. If these events are independent and short lived, then each household has a 1.52% chance of experiencing nearly zero income in any year. In the rural areas, the chance of a zero income event is 2.52%. By comparison, using PSID data, CHZ find that US households have only a 0.65% chance of experiencing a near-zero income event. 3 The chance of experiencing a near-zero income event is more than three times higher in China than in the US. In rural China, the chance of experiencing near-zero income exceeds 2.5%.
Under the strong assumptions already made, the variance of the shocks can be estimated by regressing the sample variance of ln Y it−m − ln Y it on m and a constant for all values of m that can be calculated. Using the urban sample, we estimate a standard deviation for the transitory shock of 0.523 and an estimated standard deviation for the permanent shock of 0.146. Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2010) have also used the Chinese data to calculate the income shock process, obtaining similar estimates. 4 In the rural sample, the shock's standard deviations equal 0.121
(permanent) and 0.604 (transitory). 5 They do not allow for near-zero income events in their parameterization, however.
3 It is probably not fair to compare our results restricted to no business owners with CHZ. Owning a business is difficult to define in our data set, and these results should probably be interpreted with caution. 4 Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2010) used a slightly different methodology and do not include the 2009 data.
They estimate the standard deviation to the permanent income shock to be 0.134 and the transitory component to be 0.402 in 2004 urban Chinese households, the most recent year for which they have calculations. 5 We have also run the exercise without dividing income by the national trend (annual mean). We obtain xx near zero events, standard deviation to permanent income of 0.xxx, and a standard deviation of temporary income of 0.xxx, for the urban sample.
CHZ estimated the standard deviation of permanent income shocks to be 0.126 and transitory to be 0.163, based on US PSID data. We have also redone the PSID analysis using similar years to those available in the Chinese data. We obtain a probability of a near-zero income event (p) of 0.99%, standard deviation of permanent income of 0.121, and standard deviation of temporary shock of 0.41. A summary of the income process parameters used by Carroll (1997), Chamon et al., plus our estimates from the PSID and CHNS is given in Table ? 
The Economic Model
We consider the consumption and saving decision of an infinitely-lived representative household.
At time t, the household takes as given its non-human marketable assets valued at A t and receives exogenous "labor" income of Y t , which can be spent on consumption goods C t or assets to take into the next period A t+1 . In line with the literature, and the low level of credit market development in China, we assume that the household is borrowing constrained such that 0 A t .
There are no other assets available to the household. No contingent claims or other instruments to diversify away labor income risk. The household thus faces the flow budget constraint
where R = (1 + r) is the (constant) gross real interest rate earned on assets.
The household seeks to maximize lifetime expected utility,
subject to (1) , where the period utility function has the standard constant relative risk aversion form with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ > 0 and subjective discount factor 0 < β = 1 1+δ < 1, where δ is the subjective rate of time preference. We rewrite the model in stationary form by normalizing variables by last period's permanent component of income, P t−1 . Lower case variables denote this normalization, hence c t ≡ C t /P t−1 , and so forth. The household's problem can be rewritten to maximize E t ∞ j=0 β j c
(1−γ) t+j 1−γ subject to the flow budget constraints a t+1 (G/R)N t ≤ a t + GN t V t − c t . Written in recursive form, the household's problem is V (a t , n t , u t ) = max c
subject to a t+1 (G/R)N t ≤ a t + GN t V t − c t , where (a t , n t , u t ) is the state at date t. After solving for the individual's optimal consumption and asset purchase rules, we 'run' the model for 30 periods for 20,000 individuals. Initial asset levels are set to zero in these experiments.
These people are, in the vernacular of Carroll (1997) are buffer stock savers. They have a target wealth to income ratio. In the experiments, we start people out with zero assets.
Their initial saving rates are very high as they accumulate towards their target wealth. The transitional period lasts about 12 periods after which the steady state has more or less been achieved. Hence, the steady state values that we report are averages from periods 20 to 30.
Results
The experimental results are shown in Table 9 . Household saving is aggregate household income (summed over the 20,000 individuals) minus aggregate consumption. Total income is the sum of labor income and interest on assets. Scaled net wealth is current assets plus labor income minus consumption as a proportion of permanent income. Scaled assets is the steady state asset to permanent income ratio. A higher interest rate leads to a decline in the saving rate out of labor income. This is due to the income effect arising from an interest rate change which causes consumption to increase (recall that labor income is exogenous and doesn't change with the interest rate). The saving rate out of total income, which includes interest income on assets, does increase with the interest rate. This results from the substitution effect which tilts consumption towards the future. Higher interest rates induce these people to accumulate more assets.
Variations in the growth rate of labor income work in the same way as variations in the interest rate. The experiments reported in lines 4 through 6 take the experiments of lines 1 through 3 but lowers the assumed growth rate from 7 percent to 2 percent. Lower growth results in lower saving rates but higher target wealth and asset ratios. This relationship between growth and saving rate is precisely what we see in the data. High growth countries are also high saving rate countries. An increase in the growth rate thus acts in a similar way to an increase in the interest rate. Since these buffer stock savers want to maintain a target wealth to income ratio, asset accumulation needs to take place at a higher rate in the high growth economy since income is rising at a faster rate. Hence the high growth country will have a higher saving rate.
If we compare lines 1 through 3 with lines 7 through 9, we get a general comparison between saving behavior of Chinese and American households. The model predicted saving rates out of total income in China are nearly twice the rates implied for U.S. households. Targeted wealth to income ratios are not very different.
The primary factor in this model that drives the difference in saving across countries seems not to be the higher level of labor income risk in China but the higher growth rate. If we compare lines 4 through 6 to lines 7 through 9, we can see that. In both sets of experiments, the growth rate of labor income is set to 2 percent per year. What differs, say between line 4 and line 7 is the distribution of the income shocks. The difference in risk accounts for only a small amount of the difference in saving rates.
The experiment of lines 13 and 14 uses the same rate of time preference and interest rate as Carroll (1997) in his benchmark simulations.
Lines 15 through 26 repeat the experiments of lines 1 through 12 but with a coefficient of risk aversion of 5. Here, the same patterns of behavior emerge with saving rates and target wealth levels increasing in both the interest rate and the growth rate. Even in this simple model, we can get the Chinese people to save at quite high rates if we make them sufficiently risk averse.
Conclusion
China's high growth and emergence in the world economy has been made possible in part by the willingness of its households to save a high fraction of their income. The high Chinese saving rate, however, is not so much a puzzle as it can be explained by quantitative implementations of standard neoclassical models of household consumption and saving decisions. What makes them want to save so much is the environment that they live in. Some of the more salient features of that environment are a relatively rapid decline in family size and an increase in old age dependency, substantially riskier non-capital income streams and a higher growth rate.
